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L ARGUMENT 
A. UTAH SHOULD RECOGNIZE SPOLIATION. 
Defendant/Appellees, United Parcel Service and Liberty Mutual, argue 
that Utah should not adopt spoliation as an independent cause of action. 
Defendants primarily rely upon the assertion that evidentiary inferences, 
sanctions for misconduct, or criminal penalties - or in the instant case 
administrative code, specifically the Utah OSH Act, work as effective 
deterrents against evidence tampering or destruction. See Defendant UPS Br. 
12, 21-23; Defendant Liberty Mutual Br. at 17-18. But, the reality is, none 
of these mechanisms were effective at stopping Defendants from spoiling 
evidence and Plaintiffs were consequently damaged. 
Courts adopting spoliation have reasoned that general principles of 
law necessitate recognition. "The concept of American justice...pronounces 
that for every wrong there is a remedy. It is incompatible with this concept 
to deprive a wrongfully injured party of a remedy," Hannah v. Heeter, 584 
S.E.2d 560, 566 (W.Va.,2003), and "New torts are recognized when an 
interest requiring protection from unreasonable interference is identified. 
The common thread woven into all torts is the idea of unreasonable 
interference with the interests of others." Holmes v. Amerex Rent-A-Car, 
710 A.2d 846, 848 (D.C.,1998)(internal citations omitted). 
1 
Specific to the wrong inherent in evidence destruction, Montana has 
reasoned, "[t]he intentional or negligent destruction or spoliation of evidence 
cannot be condoned and threatens the very integrity of the judicial system." 
Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Co., 993 P.2d 11, 17 (Mont., 1999). New Mexico 
concludes, "[w]e base our recognition of this tort on our be I id (hat the 
intentional destruction of potential evidence in order to disrupt or defeat 
another person's right of recovery is highly improper and cannot be 
justified." Coleman v. Eddy Potash, 905 P.2d 185, 189 (NM.,1985). 
Beyond these general and specific reasons to adopt spoliation, courts 
have identified that plaintiffs lack recourse for damages against third-party 
spoliators; therefore the tort of spoliation serves a critical legal function. 
"When evidence is in the possession of a third party, however, the various 
sanctions available to the trial judge are inapplicable and other 
considerations arise." Oliver, 993 P.2d at 17. West Virginia reasons 
similarly, "a third party spoliator is not subject to an adverse inference 
instruction or discovery sanctions. Thus, when a third party destroys 
evidence, the party who is injured by the spoliation does not have the benefit 
of existing remedies. Such a result conflicts with our policy of providing a 
remedy for every wrong and compensating victims of tortious conduct." 
Hannah, 560 S.E.2d at 568. 
2 
In the instant case, as originally pled by Plaintiffs, Defendants UPS 
and Liberty Mutual willfully and intentionally removed and altered evidence 
of Mark Hills' death, Compl. Tflj 50-51 (R. 12); engaged in such to prevent 
and hinder potential litigation against the appellees, Compl. fflf 53-54 (R. 
12); and Plaintiffs' legal cause of action was consequently damaged. 
Compl. 1| 69G-k) (R. 21-22). 
UPS trivializes what happened as "in the interest of worker safety" 
and omits the chronological fact that the Utah Occupational and Safety 
Health Division of the Labor Commission (UOSH) had instructed UPS and 
Liberty Mutual to not alter the scene the morning of the accident (UPS Br. 5-
6; R. at 915, f^ 7) and furthermore UPS had already altered the scene before 
UOSH arrived, contrary to law (R. at 915, 917; fflf 6, 15).1 Yet, despite the 
potential UOSH sanctions and potential criminal charges pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5 and § 76-2-204, Defendants still engaged in 
destruction of evidence. The established deterrents failed to thwart 
Defendants malfeasant behavior. 
1
 Irrespective of these UOSH violations, as U.C.A. 34A-6-110 prohibits use 
of OSHA provisions to affect common law duties, Plaintiffs pled a general 
duty to preserve the scene and evidence as well as a general violation of 
applicable law. Compl. Iffl 62-65 (R.14); Iffl 73-78 (R. 16-17); and ffij 86-91 
(R. 19-20). 
3 
More importantly, though, Plaintiffs cannot seek recourse for their 
damages, as further discussed below, incurred as a consequence of the third-
party Defendants' acts in the first-party lawsuit Plaintiffs filed against 
Skyline Electric Company. See, Hills v. Skyline Electric Co., Civil No. 
040107125, Third Judicial District Court (hereinafter "Hills I").(R. 613 -
718). 
As an alternative to the proposition that current legal or administrative 
mechanisms are adequate to address spoliation, UPS argues the burden upon 
the employer would be too great to preserve evidence in the event of third-
party litigation. UPS Br. 26. This contention lacks merit. Employers are 
already required by UOSH, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R614-1-
5.C.2, to preserve evidence relative to an accident scene until authorized by 
UOSH to remove or destroy such evidence. In light of this UPS's claim the 
independent tort of spoliation would further burden an employer than 
already required by administrative code is groundless. Preserved for the 
record and a potential civil suit, due to an employer's adherence to UOSH 
requirements and the ensuing UUSH accident investigation, would be 
evidence of the cause of the accident - unless, as in the instant case, the 
employer intentionally destroys such evidence. 
4 
Taking into account the lack of burden upon an employer; the need for 
legal recourse against a third-party spoliator; and the inadequacy of 
deterrents poised by Utah's administrative code or criminal sanctions, this 
Court should adopt spoliation as a legal remedy. Doing so is congruent with 
judicial axioms expressed in Hannah that for every wrong there is a remedy 
and Holmes that a party's interests should be protected from unreasonable 
interference. The destruction of evidence by a third-party without an 
available recourse for an injured first-party plaintiff runs contrary to justice. 
Such malfeasance if unaddressed, "threatens the very integrity of the judicial 
system." 
B. PLAINTIFFS HAVE PLED THE ELEMENTS OF SPOLIAHON. 
UPS and Liberty Mutual contend Plaintiffs have failed to meet the elements of 
spoliation. UPS Br. 13-19; Liberty Mutual Br. 18-22. As argued in Plaintifis brief; 
this Court should adopt the elements of spoliation set forth in Smith v. Howard 
Johnson Co., 615 N.E.2d 1037 (Oh.,1993): "(I) pending or probable 
litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of defendant that 
litigation exists or is probable, (3).willful destruction of evidence by 
defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiffs case, (4) disruption of the 
plaintiffs case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's 
acts." Smith 615 N.E.2d at 1038. These five elements, in particular the fifth 
5 
element, can be demonstrated by Plaintiffs as these Ohio factors do not 
require the inability to prove the underlying suit. 
Under the Smith elements, as previously argued in Plaintiffs' Brief, 
(1) Mark Hills' wrongful death, made litigation involving Plaintiffs 
probable; (2) the gravity of the event and Defendants' related evasive 
behavior and onsite attendance by counsel, indicates knowledge of probable 
litigation; (3) the willful alteration and destruction of evidence by 
Defendants was designed to disrupt an investigation, and thereby impede 
Plaintiffs' probable suit; (4) these actions disrupted Plaintiffs' case by 
forcing litigation with the non-parties UPS and Liberty Mutual in Hills I to 
obtain destroyed and altered causation evidence; and (5) Defendants' actions 
proximately caused damage to Plaintiffs as further discussed below. 
C. PIAESTIFFSHAVE BEEN DAMAGED. 
UPS and Liberty Mutual argue Plaintiffs have not been damaged, as 
Skyline Electric has admitted liability in the underlying Hills I lawsuit. UPS 
Br. 15; Liberty Mutual Br. 18-19. To the contrary, though, Appellants have 
been damaged by incurring the additional expense of litigating with non-
parties UPS to compel discovery in Hills I of the UOSH accident report 
[UPS restricted UOSH from releasing the report. (R. 825 - 827)]; and the 
expense and time of litigating with UPS to compel Heath Engineering's 
6 
reports and Heath Engineering personnel responsible for evidence alteration 
and destruction. (R. 913 - 927). These expenses increased the cost of 
litigating Hills I thereby reducing Plaintiffs net recovery and probable 
expectancy. As originally pled in the Complaint, and pertinent to these 
expenses, Plaintiffs sustained damages from tortious interference with a 
legal cause of action and hindrance with a lawful cause of action. Compl. f 
69(j-k) (R. 21-22). Without UPS and Liberty Mutuals' alteration and 
destruction of evidence, the forgoing legal proceedings would have been 
unnecessary. 
UPS counters that such damages cannot be assessed in a spoliation 
action, attacking Plaintiffs' citation to Thompson v. Owensby, 704 N.E.2d 
134 (In.Ct.App., 1998). UPS Br. 18.3 In Thompson, the Indiana Court of 
2
 The district court states that Plaintiffs' damages for wrongful death were 
fixed at the moment of Mark Hills' death, Dist. Ct. Op. at 5-6 n2 (R. 1228-
29 n.2). UPS and Liberty Mutual rely upon this assessment in their briefs. 
UPS Br. 15-16; Liberty Mutual Br. 28. Although the elements that compose 
a wrongful death cause of action in Utah [loss of support; loss of assistance 
and service to the family; loss of society, companionship and happiness of 
associations, and loss of the possibility of inheritance, if decedent is an adult, 
Allen v. U.S., 588 F.Supp. 247, 445 (1984)], would be fixed at time of death, 
and these damages constitute a property right for the heirs, Switzer v. 
Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247(1980), the net recovery from these injuries can 
be reduced and altered by a defendant's spoliation acts. 
UPS improperly claims that Thompson has been rejected by the Indiana 
Supreme Court. To support this UPS makes an in incomprehensible cite to 
"supra at 21 n.3." UPS Br. 18. Instead, Thompson has been distinguished by 
the Indiana Supreme Court in Glotzbach v. Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337 
7 
Appeals noted, besides alleging damages resulting from inability to prove 
the underlying suit, alternatively an injured party can assert damages due to 
the cost of conducting additional discovery needed to provide alternative 
proof due to the destroyed evidence. Thompson, 704 N.E.2d at FN 7. 
Plaintiffs, during the discovery process in Hills /, as argued above, incurred 
additional legal costs in order to discern causation as a result of the 
spoliation conducted by Defendants. 
UPS also relies upon the district court's reasoning that the damages 
Plaintiffs seek merely constitute delay, and as such do not qualify as 
compensable damages. UPS Br. 16-18. First, contrary to the district court's 
argument, motions to compel occurred in Hills /, as stated above. Second, 
these motions constituted additional discovery - the cost of which Thompson 
notes is an appropriate measure of damages, in the alternative to inability to 
prove an underlying first party suit. 
D. WORKERS' COMPENSATION BAR IS INAPPUCABLE TO UPS 
UPS incorrectly reasons that its acts of spoliation are barred by the 
exclusivity provision of Utah's Worker's Compensation Act. This argument 
dispels the applicability of the dual capacity doctrine; the willful and 
(Ind.2006) and Gribben v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 824 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 
2005). 
8 
intentional nature of UPS's spoliation; as well as the fact spoliation damages 
are considered outside the coverage formula of workers' compensation acts. 
1) THE DUAL CAPAOTY DOCTRINE APPLIES 
The application of the dual capacity doctrine depends upon "whether 
the employer's conduct in the second role or capacity has generated 
obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from the company's ... first 
role as an employer." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 
1985)(emphasis added). UPS cites the fact that Utah's OSH Act mandates 
employers to preserve post-accident evidence; therefore, UPS's obligation to 
preserve evidence stems from their role as Mark Hills' employer pursuant to 
Utah Admin. Code R614-1-5.C.2. UPS Br. 30-32. Irrespective of the 
UOSH code, though, Plaintiffs pled a general duty to preserve evidence 
[Compl. m 62-65 (R.14); fflf 75-78 (R. 16-17); ffif 88-91 (R. 19-20)] and 
Plaintiffs' Brief does not rely upon UOSH codes to impart a duty to UPS to 
preserve evidence. 
As argued (PL Br. 28-31), an obligation arose that was unrelated to 
UPS's role as Mark Hills' employer. Consistent with Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App.3d 1273, 286 Cal.Rptr. 855 (1991), 
UPS had a second capacity as an evidentiary caretaker which arose after the 
claimant's on the job related injury. Coca Cola at 1293, 867. Whether or 
9 
not this role relates to UPS's first role as Mark Hills' employer, given Utah 
precedent in Bingham, hinges upon what constitutes "flowing from." The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which interpreted Utah's potential 
application of the dual capacity doctrine as set forth in Bingham, opined 
"flowing from" is analogous to "attributable to the accident resulting in 
injury which as a primary cause set in motion a train of events from which 
the aggravated condition resulted," Worthen v. Kennecott Corporation, 780 
F.2d 856, 859 FN2 (10th Cir.,1985), citing Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 215 P. 777, 779 (1929). In the instant case, UPS's intentional 
destruction of evidence resulted in damages that were wholly unrelated to 
injury that caused the fatal electrocution of Mark Hills. The former are 
damages to probable expectancy which do not flow from the bodily 
electrocution of Mr. Hills. Instead, UPS committed a separate act that 
harmed a property right of Mr. Hills, whereas Skyline Electric's negligence 
caused the actual on-the-job injury. 
In addition, while examining Utah's potential application of the dual 
capacity doctrine, the Worthen court also explained that Utah's OSH Act 
covers a "broad range of foreseeable events set in motion by the on-the-job 
injury." Worthen, 780 F.2d at 859 (emphasis added). Intentional destruction 
10 
of post-accident evidence by an employer does not constituent a foreseeable 
event as a result of Mark Hills employment. 
2. PL\i>mora^ 
UPS 
To buttress the argument that Utah's workers' compensation 
exclusivity bar applies, and the intentional acts preclusion is inapplicable, 
UPS asserts Plaintiffs have only pled Skyline Electric caused harm to 
decedent Mark Hills. Meanwhile, UPS claims Plaintiffs failed to plead 
intentional or harmful behavior by UPS. UPS Br. 33. UPS further alleges 
that Plaintiffs never alleged UPS spoiled evidence to cover up its own 
culpability. Id. These allegations suggest that UPS confuses the underlying 
negligence tort in Hills /, an electrocution death, with the separate tort of 
spoliation asserted in the present action. 
To begin, Plaintiffs' complaint states, "defendants willfully and 
intentionally...removed and/or altered equipment, materials or other 
evidence pertaining to the cause of the electrocution." Compl. f^ 35 (R. 8). 
Plaintiffs also alleged defendants performed such acts to "cover up the true 
facts and circumstances" of Mark Hills' death and "prevent Plaintiffs from 
bringing an action against defendants." Compl. Tflj 53-54 (R. 12). Finally, 
Plaintiffs pled damages resulting from this intentional interference and 
hindrance with their legal cause of action. Compl. Iff 96 G-k)(R. 21-22). 
II 
In addition to Plaintiffs having pled the assertions UPS claims were 
not made, the issue is not culpability of UPS for the fatal electrocution. The 
issue is whether UPS's post-accident evidence destruction and alteration 
harmed Plaintiffs. The Hills I lawsuit pertains to an electrocution tort which 
UPS has nothing to do with, whereas the instant action revolves around 
evidence destruction. Furthermore, the inquiry is not about motive and 
whether UPS was hiding its culpability. Motive is not a requisite element in 
the intentional acts exception to the workers' compensation exclusivity bar. 
"Rather than defining and determining intent, the "intent to injure" analysis 
focuses on whether the actor knew or expected that injury would occur as a 
consequence of his actions, thereby distinguishing between intentional and 
unintentional workplace injuries under the Act." Helfv. Chevron U.SA., Inc., 
203 P.3d 962, 970 (Utah 2009). Thus, the inquiry is whether UPS knew or 
expected that the injury - the destruction and alteration of accident scene 
evidence - would result in damage to a potential lawsuit by Mark Hills' 
heirs against the liable party. Clearly altering or destroying evidence at an 
accident scene would impede and harm the ability to prove what caused the 
accident and who is at fault. 
12 
3. SPOLIATION DAMAGES ARE OUTSIDE WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
FORMULA. 
UPS fails to address Plaintiffs' argument that spoliation damages are 
considered outside the "coverage formula" of workers' compensation 
exclusivity provisions. PL Br. 20-23; 25; see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
105(1) (1999). This argument alone precludes the need to discuss the 
applicability of the dual capacity doctrine or whether Defendant UPS's 
behavior was willful and intentional. Spoliation damages preclusion from 
the workers' compensation formula also undermines UPS's claim that this 
Court must adopt two new theories, spoliation and the dual capacity 
doctrine, in order for Plaintiffs to prevail. UPS Br. 12. 
UPS is wrong because: (1) Utah has recognized that non-physical and 
non-mental injuries are not within the exclusivity provision of workers' 
compensation, as stated in Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 2000 UT 94, f 
19, 16 P.3d 555, and (2) jurisdictions acknowledging third-party employer-
employee spoliation delineate the damage a non-bodily injury outside the 
scope of workers' compensation coverage. Consequently, UPS's acts should 
not be barred pursuant to Utah's Workers' Compensation Act.4 
4
 Jurisdictions holding spoliation damages as outside workers' compensation 
formula/exclusivity: Florida, Lincoln Insurance Company v. Home 
Emergency Services, Inc., 812 So.2d 433, 436 (Fl. Ct. App.,2002); 
Louisiana, Carter v. Exide Corporation, 661 So.2d 698, 704 (La.App. 2 
13 
E. PIAINTIFFSHAVE PLED AND MET THE ELEMENTS OF INTENTIONAL 
INTERFERENCE 
Liberty Mutual asserts that Plaintiffs have failed to meet the elements 
of the underlying and recognized Utah tort of intentional interference 
(Liberty Mutual Br. 26-30), a tort which serves as a foundation for courts 
that adopt spoliation. Liberty Mutual attacks Plaintiffs' theory based upon 
the second and third prong of the intentional interference test put forth in 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isomer, 657 P.2d 293(Utah 1982). 
Respectively, these are: (2) the tortfeasor must act with an improper purpose 
and (3) consequently damage the plaintiff. Leigh, 657 P.2d at 304. 
Liberty Mutual premises the lack of improper purpose upon the fact 
there was a legitimate reason to alter or destroy accident scene evidence, 
citing St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 
1991). Specifically, Liberty Mutual states Defendants needed to determine 
the cause of the accident and prevent injury to others. Liberty Mutual Br. 
29. But, the reality is Defendants, despite being told to seal and isolate the 
Mobile Distribution Unit (MDA), wherein the electrocution had occurred 
(the sealing and isolation of which would have been the safest precaution), 
instead reconnected the MDA to the distribution facility and had third-party 
Cir.,1995); Montana, Oliver, 993 P.2d 11 at 16-17; and New Mexico, 
Coleman, 905 P.2d at 192. 
14 
Heath Engineering alter accident evidence. (R. 915-916). Furthermore, 
prior to UOSH's arrival on the morning of the accident, Defendants had 
already altered or destroyed evidence pertaining to the accident instead of 
taking the sensible safety precaution of restricting people from the accident 
scene and preserving the scene's integrity. (R. 914-916). 
In contrast, in St. Benedict's Hospital, upon which Liberty Mutual 
relies, the defendant hospital's damaging acts were deemed "an inevitable 
byproduct of competition." The defendant hospital had merely solicited 
tenants for a new office building - tenants who might have remained tenants 
of the plaintiffs. The court held such conduct by the hospital, engaged in 
during the regular course of business, did not qualify as improper, supra at 
201, citing Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 307. Dissimilarly, in the instant 
case, it can hardly be argued that the evidence destruction and alteration by 
the Defendants was an inevitable result of worker safety or accident 
investigation. Worker safety could have been best addressed by isolating the 
hazardous accident site from employees and Defendants' investigation easily 
conducted in accord with UOSH requirements. But, instead as alleged in 
Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendants engaged in evidence destruction and 
alteration to improperly prevent or hinder Plaintiffs' potential legal cause of 
action. Compl. fflf 53-54 (R. 12). 
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Liberty Mutual also asserts that Plaintiffs have not been able to 
demonstrate the third prong of intentional interference, damages. Liberty 
Mutual Br. 28. Plaintiffs, as previously argued in Section C above, have 
been damaged. 
F. INTERFERENCE WITH CAUSE OF ACTION CONSTITUTES SPOLIATION 
Liberty Mutual contends that "interference with a legal process" is not 
a recognized action, citing Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins., 454 F.Supp. 
1208. Liberty Mutual Br. 33. It can be assumed Liberty Mutual does so to 
refute Plaintiffs' original pleading of tortious interference with a legal cause 
of action. Compl. Tf 69(j-k) (R. 21-22). This issue, though, is a matter of 
semantics. As noted in Guilloiy v. Dillard's Dept. Store, Inc., Ill So.2d 1 
(App. LA,2000), "[i]n some cases, when a plaintiff claims that the ability to 
institute or prove a civil claim has been impaired due to the negligent or 
intentional spoliation of evidence by another, courts have addressed the 
causes of action for impairment of a civil claim and spoliation of evidence as 
one. Thus, we believe that it is of little importance here, to determine an 
exact title to label plaintiffs claim." Id. at 4. 
Liberty Mutual also references the Idaho Supreme Court in Yoakum v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 416 (1996) to indicate that "unreasonable 
interference" is necessary to demonstrate interference with a prospective 
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civil action - and presumably that Plaintiffs have not established such. 
Liberty Mutual Br. 34-35. In Yoakum, though, the defendant insurer had 
merely hired an accident investigator whose original evaluation of a golf cart 
involved in an accident found the cart defective. During this investigator's 
second evaluation of the cart - while in the employ of the defendant insurer 
- he found no defect in the cart. The court reasoned the insurer's retention 
of the expert was merely meant to "minimize [the insured's] liability, and 
therefore its own exposure to substantial damages therefrom, by hiring [the 
expert] to reinvestigate the vehicle and the accident. That is clearly not an 
improper motive." Id. at 424. In the instant case, Defendants' Liberty 
Mutual and UPS's acts did not constitute mere reinvestigation of the 
accident scene. Right after the accident as well as after an initial visit by 
UOSH's Compliance Officer defendants altered, removed, or destroyed 
evidence of the cause of the electrocution. These deliberate acts, given 
Plaintiffs' likely wrongful death lawsuit, constitute unreasonable 
interference - or "tortious interference" as pled by Plaintiffs. 
G. PUNITIVE DAMAGES APPLY IF SPOLIATION IS RECOGNIZED 
UPS cites due process considerations to refute the application of 
punitive damages as a deterrent against spoliation. UPS Br. 34-35. Yet, the 
first case UPS relies upon, State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 
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U.S. 408 (2003), is a US Supreme Court decision that adjudicates whether 
the excessive size of a punitive damage claim satisfies due process criteria5 - not 
if the imposition of punitive damages in a previously unrecognized tort violates due 
process. 
UPS also relies upon Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) to 
assert violation of due process. The Landgraf opinion proves a poor analogy. The 
Landgrqf court, after a lengthy analysis of what should be considered if a statute 
retroactively applies punitive damages, held this question inapplicable as the statute at 
issue did not explicitly apply retroactive punitive damages. More importantly, 
although Landgraf s dicta indicates there is a presumption against statutory 
retroactivity, it is not a per se violation of due process to apply duties or damages 
retroactively. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), the US 
Supreme Court reasoned, "our cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and 
burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is 
true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based 
on past acts," supra at 17 (internal citations omitted). 
In Usery, unlike Landgraf which UPS relies upon, the law in question 
explicitly imposed retrospective liability. Therefore, the US Supreme Court took a 
further two step analysis to decide if due process was violated First, the possibility 
5
 Held that $145 million in punitive damages award on $1 million compensatory 
judgment violated due process. 
18 
that the tortfeasor did not know harm would be caused by his actions must be 
considered Second, it must be asked, even if the tortfeasor knew harm was eminent 
did he behave in reliance upon the current state of the law? Id In the case subjudice, 
it is implicit that UPS and Liberty Mutual would know destruction or alteration of an 
accident scene would affect potential causation evidence in a third-party lawsuit -
thereby harming plaintiffs. And, most certainly, UPS and Liberty Mutual did not rely 
upon any law allowing them to destroy or alter accident scene evidence. To the 
contrary, Defendants violated Utah Admin. Code, R614-1-5.C.2. 
Meanwhile, Liberty Mutual argues punitive damages are inapplicable as 
Plaintiffs' have not effectively pled intentional acts or proved an underlying viable 
cause of action. These issues, as previously argued above and in Plaintiffs' Brief, 
remain to be decided by this Court. 
EL CONCLUSION 
The district court erred when it granted Defendant UPS's Motion to Dismiss, 
with prejudice, as Plaintiffs' allegations were sufficiently pled to constitute spoliation 
- a cause of action that should be recognized in Utah; Plaintiffs' allegations were 
sufficiently pled to invoke the dual capacity doctrine; and Plaintiffs' allegations were 
sufficiently pled to fall within the "intentional acf exception to Utah's Workers 
Compensation Act Moreover, Liberty Mutual should have not been dismissed with 
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prejudice, as none of the Workers' Compensation Act exclusivity provisions apply to 
Liberty Mutual, given Liberty Mutual did not employ decedent Mark Hills. 
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